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Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency
for Defrauded Investors?
By Barbara Black*
One of the important functions of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("the
SEC") is enforcing the securities laws and punishing violators. Collecting damages for de-
frauded investors was not, historically, an important part of the agency's mission; rather
that was the function of private securities fraud class actions. Section 308 (the "Fair Fund
provision") of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 gives the SEC a more prominent role in com-
pensating investors and allows the agency, in some circumstances, to distribute civil penalties
to defrauded investors. The SEC has established Fair Funds in a number of high-profile cases
and has taken pride in the large amounts of money it has obtained for investors. Meanwhile,
section 308 has become an instrument in the business community's campaign against private
securities fraud class actions.
This Article reviews the background of the SEC's disgorgement and penalty powers, the
history and language of section 308, and SEC enforcement actions against corporations in
financialfraud cases and then looks at the business community's reaction to section 308 and
recent SEC enforcement actions. The Article concludes that the SEC's increased emphasis on
section 308 could lead to a weakening of its effectiveness as an enforcement agency and fur-
ther erode support for private securities litigation-an unfortunate outcome for investors.
INTRODUCTION
One of the important functions of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC" or "Commission") is protecting investors' from fraud through
* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of Cincinnati
College of Law.
1. The SEC describes its mission as threefold: "[tlo protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and ef-
ficient markets; and facilitate capital formation." See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, About
the SEC, What We Do, http://www.sec.gov/aboutl/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2008); U.S.
SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, 2004-2009 STRATEGIC PLAN 4 (2004) [hereinafter "STRATEGIC PLAN"J, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan0409.pdf. The Strategic Plan also sets forth four agency-wide
goals: to enforce compliance with federal securities laws, to sustain an effective and flexible regulatory
environment, to encourage and promote informed investment decision making, and to maximize the
use of SEC resources. Id. at 3.
The SEC's identification of its mission is consistent with that of international securities regulators.
See INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS (IOSCO), OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SEcuRmEs REGULATION (1998), http:f/
www.riskinstitute.ch/144440.htm (identifying objectives as protecting investors, ensuring that markets
are fair, efficient, and transparent, and reducing systemic risk) [hereinafter "IOSCO, OBJECrIVEs &
PRINCIPLE"J.
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enforcement of the securities laws and punishment of violators.2 Historically, the
SEC has not considered collecting damages for injured investors as an important
part of its mission.3 Recovering money for investors' losses, instead, has been the
function of private securities fraud class actions.
4
Section 308 (the "Fair Fund provision") of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
("SOX"), 5 however, gives the SEC a more prominent role in compensating de-
frauded investors. The statute allows the agency, in some circumstances, to dis-
tribute civil penalties for federal securities law violations, ordinarily paid into the
U.S. Treasury, to investors who have been harmed by those violations.6 The SEC
embraced section 308 enthusiastically, stating that it "intends to use [section 3081
whenever reasonably possible, consistent with its mission to protect investors. 7 It has
established Fair Funds in a number of high-profile cases involving financial fraud
by corporate defendants, 8 and it has taken pride in the large amounts of money it
2. The SEC protects investors in many ways in addition to enforcement. For example, the SEC
regulates to improve the quality of markets, market participants, and corporate governance and to im-
prove the quality of information available to investors. See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 1, at 3.
3. John D. Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 DUKE L.J.
641,644 n.15 ("The Commission attempts to avoid being a collection agency for injured investors...."
(quoting SEC Commissioner Richard B. Smith in 1968)). In the 1960s, Professor Louis Loss criticized
the SEC for not seeking restitution as a remedy on behalf of small investors. See id. at 644. After the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX"), the SEC continued to emphasize the subsid-
iary role of compensating investors. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(c)
OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002 19-20 (2003) [hereinafter "SEcroN 308(c) REPORT"], available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf. Shortly after SOX was enacted, however, SEC
Chairman Harvey L. Pitt described the agency's "principal goal of taking care of innocent investors and
trying to make them whole when they have been defrauded." See Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the U.S. Department of Justice Corporate Fraud Conference (Sept. 26,
2002), www.sec.gov/newsspeech/spch585.htm.
4. On the relationship between private and public securities law actions, see IOSCO, OBJECrivES &
PRINCIPLES, supra note 1 (standard 8.3) (stating that "[als a general matter, [a securities regulator's] en-
forcement powers should not compromise private rights of action. Private persons should be able to
seek their own remedies."). Professor John Coffee, however, argues that private securities fraud class
actions do a poor job of compensating investors and their principal function should be deterrence. See
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Imple-
mentation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534 (2006).
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7246 (Supp. V 2005)) [hereinafter "section 308"].
6. Id.
7. SECTION 308(c) REPORT, supra note 3, at 22 (emphasis added). The SEC, in its 2003 Annual Report,
notes the SEC's efforts to increase sanctions and, whenever practical, return the recovered funds to
investors. See U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, 2003 ANNUAL REPORr 24 (2003) [hereinafter "2003 REPORT"],
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annrepO3.shtml. The SEC has reiterated this intention in subse-
quent annual reports. See U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, 2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 5
(2005) [hereinafter "2005 PAR"], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2005.shtml; U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 6 (2006) [hereinafter "2006 PAR"], avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2006.shtml.
8. See infra Part II.B.3. The SEC has also used section 308 to create Fair Funds in enforcement ac-
tions involving market timing and other abuses in mutual funds. See, e.g., In re Evergreen Inv. Mgmt.
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 56462, at 14-15 (Sept. 19, 2007) ($28.5 million in disgorgement
and $4 million in penalties), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56462.pdf.
This Article does not discuss these actions, as these cases, similar to insider trading cases, gener-
ally involve identifiable gains to the wrongdoers and do not present the same issues as the financial
fraud cases.
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has obtained for distribution to investors.9 Meanwhile, section 308 has become an
instrument in the business community's campaign against private securities fraud
class actions. Business community leaders argue that the SEC's power to collect
funds for injured investors makes private litigation unnecessary. 0 The U.S. Su-
preme Court, in Stoneridge Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., referred to SEC
collections under the Fair Fund provision as a policy ground for not expanding
outside actors' Rule 10b-5 liability to private parties."
Providing compensation to defrauded investors is a laudable goal that makes
quarreling with section 308 difficult, and indeed academic commentators have
viewed it favorably 2 If, however, compensating investors is an appropriate charge
for an enforcement agency like the SEC,' 3 it bears asking why Congress never
seriously considered augmenting the agency's mission in this way prior to SOX
despite numerous amendments to the securities laws to enhance the agency's en-
forcement powers and expand its remedies.' 4 We do not know whether congres-
sional enactment of section 308 was merely political happenstance or part of a
new vision for SEC enforcement.
If section 308 is indeed part of a new vision for SEC enforcement, Congress
chose to give the agency a function that recognized international principles of
securities regulation do not identify as a responsibility of securities regulators. 15
Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider whether expanding the SEC's role to
include recovering losses for defrauded investors is compatible with the agency's
longstanding emphasis on enforcing securities laws, sanctioning securities law
9. For example, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox stated: "[iun 2006, we continued to order record
monies to be returned to harmed investors... $50 million in McAfee; $50 million in Tyco; $55 million
in Hartford; $153 million in Security Brokerage; $250 million in Bear Steams; $270 million in Pru-
dential; $350 million in Fannie Mae; and $800 million in AIG.... [Dluring my 80-week tenure with
the Commission, we have distributed over a billion dollars to injured investors." Christopher Cox,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Opening Remarks to the Practicing Law Institute's SEC Speaks
Series (Feb. 9, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch0209O7cc.htm.
10. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
11. 128 S. Ct. 761, 773 (2008).
12. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry,
53 DuKE L.J. 737, 742 (2003). Professor Cunningham views the goal more skeptically See Lawrence A.
Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN.
L. REv. 915, 971 n.263 (2003).
13. While other federal agencies have the power to collect damages for private parties who have
been injured by the regulated party's misconduct, I have found no other statute that authorizes pay-
ment of civil penalties collected by an agency to victims. The Commodities Futures Trading Com-
mission (the "CFTC"), for example, has statutory authority to require commodities brokers to make
"restitution to customers of damages proximately caused by [statutory] violations" and to impose sanc-
tions, including civil penalties. See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2000); Press Release, Commodities Futures Trading
Comm'n, CFTC Administrative Law Judge Orders Civil Monetary Penalty of $1.77 Million, Revoca-
tion of Registration, Permanent Trading Ban, and Cease and Desist Order Against Michael F Staryk of
Florida (June 11, 1996), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf96/opastaryk-a.htm. The penalties are paid to the
United States. 17 C.FR. § 143.1 (2007).
14. See, e.g., infra notes 18, 23-25 and accompanying text.
15. Instead, the IOSCO recognizes in its standards that investors should have access to "a neutral
mechanism" (courts or an alternative dispute resolution forum) to seek compensation for their inju-
ries. See IOSCO, OBJECnVES & PRINciPLEs, supra note 1 (standard 4.2.1).
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violators, and deterring future frauds.16 Otherwise, there is a danger that section
308 will ultimately lead to a weakening of the effectiveness of the SEC as an en-
forcement agency as well as further erosion of support for private securities fraud
class actions.
Part I of this Article reviews the history of the SEC's disgorgement and penalty
powers. Part II examines the background and statutory language of section 308,
SEC enforcement actions utilizing the Fair Fund provision, and the advantages
the statute gives the SEC over private litigants. Part III examines the business
community's support for section 308 at the same time that business has pressured
the SEC to reduce the size of corporate penalties. Part IV examines the SEC's mis-
sion and other policy implications from the increased attention given to its role in
compensating investors. This Article concludes that the outcome that the business
community is advocating-that the primary mechanism for compensating inves-
tors is section 308-would be an unfortunate one for investors.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SEC's DISGORGEMENT
AND PENALTY POWERS
A. DISGORGEMENT
For much of the SEC's existence its statutory remedies were very limited, and
the agency relied on the courts' equitable powers to fashion "ancillary relief" to
bolster its enforcement powers. 7 Before the Securities Enforcement Remedies and
Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 ("1990 Act"),' 8 the SEC had no express authority
to collect and distribute funds to defrauded investors in either judicial or admin-
istrative proceedings. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.19 was the first case in which
an appellate court recognized the disgorgement remedy and required corporate
insiders who traded on material nonpublic information to disgorge their illegal
trading profits. The insider trading cases were compelling opportunities for the
SEC to seek the disgorgement remedy because they involved identifiable gains
from illegal conduct and requiring disgorgement was a logical deterrent to future
violations. The court in SEC v. First City Financial Corp., Ltd.20 confirmed that
16. See, e.g., SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 E3d 1031, 1037, 1047 (9th Cir.) (noting the
deterrent effect of SEC enforcement actions), cert. denied sub nom. Yuen v. SEC, 546 U.S. 933 (2005).
17. For earlier literature discussing the SEC's enforcement remedies, see generally George W Dent, Jr.,
Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REv. 865 (1983);
Arnold S. Jacobs, judicial and Administrative Remedies Available to the SEC for Breaches of Rule IOb-5, 53
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 397 (1979); Ellsworth, supra note 3; James R. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil
Enforcement Suits, 89 l-LARv. L REv. 1779 (1976); Arthur F Matthews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested
Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunction Actions, 31 Bus. LAw. 1323 (1976); James C. Treadway, Jr., SEC
Enforcement Techniques: Expanding and Exotic Forms of Ancillary Relief, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 637
(1975).
18. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter "1990 Act"].
19. 446 F2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
20. 890 E2d 1215, 1229-32 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court found that the defendant had profited
from its section 13(d) violation because it was able to buy another corporation's stock at prices lower
than they would have been had its position in the corporation been disclosed. Id. at 1231.
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the disgorgement remedy was not limited to insider trading violations when it
required a corporate defendant to disgorge its profits that resulted from a Williams
Act violation. Significantly, the SEC viewed disgorgement as an enforcement tool
and not as a means to compensate investors. 2' Because the agency's focus was to
take the money from the defendants, it was less concerned with what happened
to the funds.
22
The 1990 Act gave the SEC express authority to order disgorgement as a rem-
edy in administrative proceedings;23 the Act's legislative history makes clear that
Congress assumed that disgorgement was already available as a remedy in judicial
proceedings.2 4 The 1990 Act also authorized the SEC to adopt rules to implement
the disgorgement provision, including procedures for distributing the funds to
investors.
25
In the pre-SOX era, the SEC sought disgorgement in judicial actions against
corporate issuers and insiders disseminating materially misleading information
into the marketplace in two categories of cases. In the first category, a corpora-
tion that was not selling its securities released materially misleading (usually op-
timistic) misstatements into the marketplace through press releases or Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") reports that affected the price at which
secondary traders (usually buyers) traded in the securities and resulted in their
injury, usually because they overpaid for the securities.26 In these situations, the
SEC sought disgorgement from corporate insiders who profited from trading in
the corporation's securities during the period in which prices were affected by the
misinformation.27 The SEC also occasionally required disgorgement of insiders'
performance-based compensation when the compensation was inflated as a result
21. See SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 E3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that the purpose of the dis-
gorgement remedy is to take profits away from violators, not primarily to compensate investors).
22. See Rory C. Flynn, SEC Distribution Plans in Insider Trading Cases, 48 Bus. LAw. 107, 110 (1992).
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (formerly the U.S. General Accounting Office) (the-"GAO")
found in 1994 that the SEC did not maintain aggregate information on the amount of disgorged funds
collected from defendants and distributed to investors or to the U.S. Treasury See U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABIL-
nT OFFICE, REPORT O THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITrEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN SEC CONTROLS
OVER DISGORGEMENT CASES 3 (Aug. 1994), available at http:llarchive.gao.gov/t2pbat2/152354.pdf.
23. 1990 Act, supra note 18, §§ 202(a), 203, 104 Stat. at 937-40 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-
2(e), 78u-3(e) (2000)).
24. See S. REP. No. 101-337, at 8 (1990) [hereinafter "SENATE REPORT"].
25. 1990 Act, supra note 18, §§ 202(a), 203, 104 Stat. at 937-40 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-
2(e), 78u-3(e) (2000)).
26. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-49 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the
"fraud-on-the-market" theory and established that secondary traders could sue an issuer without any
showing of reliance and thus no semblance of privity with the issuer. While Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-46 (2005), and its requirement of loss causation established that simply
overpaying for securities did not establish a Rule lOb-5 claim, the opinion does not detract from the
central point that the focus is on the injury to secondary traders and there is no requirement of gain
to the corporation.
27. For recent examples, see SEC v. Maxxon, Inc., 465 E3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding
that company founder and chief executive officer had to disgorge profits from sale of stock made after
fraudulent press release), cert. denied, 127 S. CL. 2116 (2007); SEC v.Johnson, 174 F App'x 111, 113
(3d Cir. 2006) (finding that corporate insider had to disgorge profits from trading after he fraudulently
caused his company to file two false registration statements with the SEC).
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of the misinformation.28 The SEC, however, did not seek disgorgement from en-
tity defendants in these cases because while the entity may have benefited in many
ways from its increased market capitalization, it is hard to identify any "profits"
or "ill-gotten gains" in the absence of the entity's sale of its securities. The SEC
does not appear ever to have argued that the definition of "profits" includes the
increase in the entity's value resulting from increased market capitalization or im-
proper accounting practices. Indeed, requiring a corporation to disgorge amounts
other than assets received by the corporation would raise serious questions about
inflicting undue harm on the corporation or, more pertinently, its innocent share-
holders who did not benefit from the fraud.
The second category of cases where the SEC sought disgorgement were in-
stances in which the entity made materially misleading statements in connection
with selling its securities. In those situations, the entity directly benefited from the
fraud, and the disgorgement remedy was viewed as comparable to the remedies
of rescission and restitution because of at least a semblance of privity between the
corporation and the investor.29 The most egregious of these frauds involved Ponzi
schemes where the SEC routinely sought to shut down the enterprise and appoint a
receiver in an attempt to recover any available funds for the defrauded investors.30
In those situations, disgorgement was appropriate because the entire enterprise
was fraudulent and there was an identity of interest between the enterprise and
the principals; accordingly, the SEC did not need to concern itself with preserving
a legitimate business to protect the interests of innocent shareholders. In other in-
stances, the SEC sought disgorgement from an entity-issuer when it sold securities
in violation of the conditions of the offering.3' Even in situations in which the en-
tity sold securities whose value had been inflated by the corporation's misleading
disclosures, however, the SEC frequently sought disgorgement only from those
insiders who had profited from the fraud.
32
These cases illustrate that prior to the adoption of section 308, the SEC used
the disgorgement remedy: (1) only where there were identifiable profits resulting
from the fraud; and (2) primarily as an enforcement tool. 33
28. See, e.g., SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F3d 1031, 1037, 1047 (9th Cir.) (requiring
corporate insiders to disgorge bonuses), cert. denied sub nom. Yuen v. SEC, 546 U.S. 933 (2005).
29. See, e.g., SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F3d 1186, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
where disgorgement resulted from violations of "mini-max" offering conditions, there was no need to
distinguish between disgorgement and restitution), cert. denied sub nor. Sands v. SEC, 525 U.S. 1121
(1999).
30. See, e.g., SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (appointing
receiver and disgorging gains from Ponzi scheme); SEC v. Rose Fund LLC, 156 E App'x 3, 4 (9th Cir.
2005) (finding that no jury trial was required on whether defendant had to disgorge profits).
31. See, e.g., First Pac. Bancorp, 142 E3d at 1190; SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 E2d 1082,
1104 (2d Cir. 1972) (affirming district court's order requiring disgorgement of proceeds of offering).
32. See, e.g., SEC v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 88 F App'x 744, 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nor. Quinn v. SEC, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004); SEC v. Carrillo, 325 E3d 1268, 1270 (1 1th Cir. 2003); SEC v.
Alliance Leasing Corp., 28 F App'x 648, 651 (9th Cir. 2002).
33. In contrast, the purpose of the CFTC's restitution remedy is to compensate the injured custom-
ers of the commodities broker, and the total amount of the compensation is limited by requirements
of privity and reliance. See supra note 13.
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B. CIVIL PENALTIES
Although in 1979 Professor Colin Diver, an eminent administrative law scholar,
stated that it was "almost inconceivable that Congress would authorize a major
administrative regulatory program without empowering the enforcing agency to
impose civil monetary penalties as a sanction,' 34 the SEC's broad authority to seek
civil penalties is of more recent origin.35 As with disgorgement, insider trading was
the impetus; Congress first gave the SEC statutory authority to impose civil penal-
ties for insider trading violations in 1984.36 Congress did so again in 1988. 37 Not
until the 1990 Act did Congress, citing "the disturbing levels of financial fraud,
stock manipulation and other illegal activity in the U.S. markets," 38 grant the SEC
broad power, both in court and in administrative proceedings, to seek penalties
for any violation of the federal securities statutes.39 Congress expected that civil
penalties would "deter unlawful conduct by increasing the financial consequences
of securities law violations." 4° In particular, it noted that penalties would help
deter conduct that otherwise would produce financial returns to the violator,4'
provide financial disincentives for violations in cases in which the violator was
unwilling to incur compliance costs,42 and create additional deterrence for recidi-
vist violators.4 3 Congress also anticipated that to satisfy its objective of deterrence,
civil penalties might not be necessary in instances where criminal penalties had
been imposed.44
The congressional goals thus conformed with the general purpose of penalties:
to "discourage conduct that the government wishes to discourage and encourage
conduct that it wishes to encourage.145 Professor Diver also thought that penalties
34. Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1435, 1436 (1979).
35. In contrast, the U.S. Department ofiustice ("DOJ") has had the power to seek criminal penalties
for securities violations since 1934; the maximum amount for a criminal corporate penalty is currently
$25 million. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp. V 2005). As discussed at infra notes 97-137 and acdompany-
ing text, recent civil corporate penalties have substantially exceeded that amount.
36. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264, 1264-65 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
37. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 2, 102
Stat. 4677, 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
38. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 1. For background on the 1990 Act, see generally James Tread-
way, Looking for the Perfect Enforcement Remedy: Old Wine in New Bottles or: Have I Seen This Movie
Before?, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 859 (1991).
39. 1990 Act, supra note 18, § 202(a), 104 Stat. at 937-38 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78u-2 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007)).
40. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 24, at 1.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 11. For an assessment of whether the SEC followed these guidelines in the early years after
enactment of the 1990 Act, see Arthur B. Laby & W Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement Under
the 1990 Remedies Act: Civil Money Penalties, 58 ALB. L. REV. 5, 46, 48 (1994) (concluding that the SEC
has not followed many of the congressional factors and also noting that the availability of penalties has
dramatically changed the SEC's approach to enforcement).
44. See H. REp. No. 101-616 (1990), at 18-19, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1384,
1385-86.
45. Diver, supra note 34, at 1456.
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could be used to serve a "general" compensatory function, which he defined as
"compensating 'society' at large for harm that it has suffered at the hands of a vio-
lator."46 According to Professor Diver, however, "[bly definition, a civil monetary
penalty does not serve a 'specific' compensatory function of making whole an
identifiable individual specifically injured by the offending conduct."
47
The 1990 Act gives the SEC the authority to seek penalties against all defendants
in federal district court48 for any securities violation and, in turn, gives the court
broad discretion to determine whether to impose a penalty and in what amount.49
The statute classifies penalties and establishes dollar limits on the amounts of pen-
alties in accordance with the severity of the offense. 50 Despite the monetary caps,
the amount of the penalty may equal the "gross amount of pecuniary gain" to the
defendant as a result of the violation.5 According to the legislative history of the
1990 Act, this phrase means "the amount by which the defendant was unjustly
enriched,"52 an apparent reference to disgorgement.
The 1990 Act's legislative history reflects a recognition that the costs of corpo-
rate penalties are ultimately borne by the corporation's shareholders. Corporate
penalties, therefore, are appropriate "when the violation result[ed] in an improper
benefit to shareholders."53 In situations where the shareholders are "the principal
46. Id. Alternatively, the payment of a penalty can be seen as compensating the government for the
costs it incurs in enforcing the law. Id.
47. Id.
48. 1990 Act, supra note 18, § 201(2), 104 Stat. at 936 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(3) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)). In addition, the SEC has the power to seek penalties in admin-
istrative proceedings against regulated entities and securities industry professionals, see 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78u-2(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2007), except that, in some circumstances, it can seek a penalty in a
cease and desist proceeding against anyone who was a cause of a violation of 15 U.S.C. section 78j-1
(Supp. V 2005) (audit requirements). There must be a finding that the penalty is in the public interest,
taking into account a number of factors. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c) (2000).
49. 1990 Act, supra note 18, § 201(2), 104 Stat. at 936 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(i) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
50. 1990 Act, supra note 18, § 201(2), 104 Stat. at 936 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(3)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)). Penalties for violations other than insider trading are classi-
fied as Tier I, Tier I1, and Tier III depending on the severity of the offense (with Tier III providing for
the largest penalties):
" Tier I: $5,000 for a natural person or $50,000 for any other person or the gross amount of
pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result of the violation (whichever is greater).
" Tier II: $50,000 for a natural person or $250,000 for any other person or the gross amount of
pecuniary gain to the defendant as a result of the violation (whichever is greater) if the viola-
tion involved "fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory
requirement."
" Tier III: $100,000 for a natural person or $500,000 for any other person or the gross amount
of pecuniary gain to the defendant as a result of the violation (whichever is greater) if the viola-
tion "involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory
requirement" and it resulted in "substantial losses or created a significant risk of substantial
losses to other persons."
Id. (The amounts are adjusted for inflation.)
51. See id.
52. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 24, at 13. Professor Diver questioned penalty statutes that tied the
amount of the penalty to the severity of the harm "since the harms involved are 'specific' harms that
can be, and presumably are, compensated directly" Diver, supra note 34, at 1468.
53. SENATE REPOR, supra note 24, at 17.
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victims of the violation,"54 however, penalties against individual wrongdoers55 are
more appropriate. So, for example, the SEC should not impose a penalty on an
entity that perpetrated a Ponzi scheme; instead, it should return any recovered
funds to the defrauded investors and impose penalties on the individuals respon-
sible for the fraud. Furthermore, in deciding against whom to assess penalties, it
is proper for the SEC to take into account whether the penalties "will ultimately be
paid by shareholders who were themselves victimized by the violations" and "the
extent to which the passage of time has resulted in shareholder turnover."56
The appellate courts that have reviewed either lower court or SEC-imposed
penalties do not provide much guidance as to the scope, target, and amount of
civil penalties except to confirm the discretionary nature of the remedy 7 The
statutory limitations on the amount of the penalty are applicable "for each viola-
tion"; there is, however, a considerable degree of interpretation about what consti-
tutes a "violation," particularly in the typical financial fraud situation where many
defendants have made numerous misstatements that allegedly violate a number
of different statutory provisions."' Rather than addressing these issues of statu-
tory interpretation, courts frequently focus on the defendant's gain in assessing a
penalty,59 which presents the same difficulty of calculating gain as do the disgorge-
ment cases60 when the corporation is not selling its securities.
II. SECTION 308's FAIR FUND PROVISION
(DISGORGEMENT PLUS PENALTY)
A. THE STATUTE
In enacting SOX in 2002, Congress explicitly authorized the SEC to collect
funds to compensate investors for their losses.6 First, SOX bestows broad author-
ity for "any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The legislative history does not elaborate on the significance of shareholder turnover, but
presumably the burden of corporate penalties should be borne by the shareholders at the time of the
wrongdoing if they were the beneficiaries of the corporation's misconduct.
57. See, e.g., Clawson v. SEC, No. 03-73199, 2005 WL 2174637, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2005)
(upholding administrative penalty on corporate insider as well within the SEC's discretion); SEC v.
Amazon Natural Treasures, Inc., 132 E App'x 701, 703 (9th Cir.) (holding that district court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing third-tier penalty), cert. denied sub nom. Sylver v. SEC, 546 U.S. 1076
(2005).
58. See, e.g., SEC v. Haligiannis, 470 F Supp. 2d 373, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating that each of
the quarterly statements sent to each of the investors is a materially false statement that technically
constitutes a separate violation). See also Ralph C. Ferrara, Thomas A. Ferrigno & David S. Durland,
Hardball! The SEC's New Arsenal of Enforcement Weapons, 47 Bus. LAw. 33,44-46 (1991) (discussing the
interpretive issues involving "violation").
59. See, e.g., Haligiannis, 470 F Supp. 2d at 386 (ordering penalty in the approximate amount of the
defendant's ill-gotten gains because of difficulty in calculating total number of violations). Laby and
Callcott observe, however, that in cases involving financial reporting violations, the defendant's gain
may be impossible to calculate. Laby & Callcott, supra note 43, at 49.
60. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
61. Section 308, supra note 5. Two other provisions enhance the SEC's power to collect funds for
investors. Section 1103 gives the SEC the power, during an investigation, to seek a temporary order
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investors,' 62 thus removing any lingering doubt about the availability of disgorge-
ment in judicial proceedings. 63 Second, section 308 provides that:
If in any judicial or administrative action... the Commission obtains an order requir-
ing disgorgement against any person .... or such person agrees in settlement of any
such action to such disgorgement, and the Commission also obtains.., a civil penalty
against such person, the amount of the civil penalty shall, on the motion or at the
direction of the Commission, be added to and become part of the disgorgement fund
for the benefit of the victims of such violation.
64
The statute thus sets forth two conditions for the creation of the fund--dis-
gorgement by a violator and a civil penalty paid by the same violator. In these
circumstances, the statute confers upon the SEC the authority to include the civil
penalty, along with the disgorgement amount, in a Fair Fund for distribution to
the victims of the violation.
65
The genesis for section 308 was contained in a House bill that provided for
creation of a fund consisting of the proceeds of any enforcement actions against
Enron and Arthur Andersen, including civil penalties, with former Enron employees
who were participants in Enron's retirement funds having priority in the allocation
of the fund.66 While the Senate-passed bill that was the source for most provisions
of SOX did not include a comparable provision, the House members of the SOX
Conference Committee added section 308 in the joint House-Senate negotiations
that produced the final legislation. 67 The Conference Committee did not produce
a report on the legislation, and SOX was adopted virtually without debate.
68
requiring a company to escrow "extraordinary payments" to insiders. SOX § 1103, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
3(c)(3) (Supp. V 2005). Section 304 requires reimbursement to the company by insiders of any per-
formance-based bonuses or profits from sales of the company's securities if the company is required to
restate its financial statements. SOX § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (Supp. V 2005).
62. SOX § 305(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (Supp. V 2005).
63. See SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F3d 105, 116-20 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that district court has
ancillary jurisdiction to enter a disgorgement order).
64. See Section 308, supra note 5.
65. The SEC is not required to create a disgorgement fund. See Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Worldcom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 2006). In instances where distribution
would not be an efficient use of resources, the SEC has remitted both the disgorged amount and the
penalty to the U.S. Treasury. SECTION 308(c) REPORT, supra note 3, at 14. However, one district court
reviewed the SEC's decision not to establish a fund under its general equitable powers to ensure that
a plan was "fair and reasonable" and declined to approve disbursement of funds to the U.S. Treasury
without a better estimate of the expense and difficulty involved in compensating injured investors. See
SEC v. Hoberg, No. 03-04135 HRL, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 07, 2007) (on file with The Business
Lawyer).
Section 308 also authorizes the SEC to accept and administer gifts for a disgorgement fund. SOX
§ 308(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7246(b) (Supp. V 2005). A church that received a $2.3 million donation from
a man later charged in an investment scam gave that amount to a Fair Fund set up for victims of the
fraud. Business Briefing, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2006, at D2.
66. H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 13 (2002), reprinted in JOHN T. BosTEuLAN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DESK-
BOOK app. J (2006) [hereinafter "DESKBOOK"l.
67. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Corporate Conduct: The Overview; Negotiators Agree on Broad Changes in
Business Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at Al, available at http://select.nytimes.comlgst/abstract.
html?res=F50A1FFB3B5COC768EDDAEO894DA404482.
68. BOsTELAN, DESKBOOK, supra note 66, at § 2:6.3.
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Because of SOX's absence of legislative history, we do not know why Congress,
for the first time, explicitly authorized the SEC to seek compensation on behalf of
defrauded investors. We also do not know why Congress chose to condition the
distribution of a penalty to investors on obtaining disgorgement from the same
violator. Perhaps that decision stemmed from congressional focus on the specific
facts of Enron6--one of the classic situations for disgorgement-in which the
employee-investors purchased securities while the corporate insiders personally
profited from their fraud by selling their shares70 and receiving inflated perfor-
mance-based compensation. 71 More abstractly, Congress may have thought that the
requirement of disgorgement would ensure that corporate violators had measurable
ill-gotten gains that justified the impact of corporate penalties on the then-current
innocent shareholders. Alternatively, Congress may have viewed ill-gotten gains as
the equivalent of restitution and seen disgorgement as a proxy for investor harm,
so that distribution of the penalty to investors would not be a windfall recovery.72
For whatever reason, disgorgement by a violator was a condition to that violator's
penalties (and only that violator's penalties) being included in the Fair Fund. Un-
less the corporation committing the fraud has identifiable profits to disgorge, the
statute requires that any corporate penalty be paid into the U.S. Treasury.
Section 308's two conditions seemingly impose a substantial limitation on the
effective use of a Fair Fund in market fraud enforcement actions against corpora-
tions that do not sell their securities during the period in which they make the
material misstatements or omissions.7 3 The SEC has sought an amendment to
section 308 to allow distribution of civil penalties in the absence of disgorgement
or, failing that, to permit penalties paid by any co-defendant to be put into a Fair
Fund with the profits disgorged from another co-defendant.74 To date, Congress
has not taken any action on the proposed amendment.
69. As of February 2008, although there was $440 million in the Fair Fund for Enron investors,
distributions had not yet begun. See Enron Victim Trust, http://www.enronvictimtrust.com (last visited
Feb. 1, 2008).
70. Throughout 2001, prior to public disclosure of Enron's financial problems, Enron chief execu-
tive officer Kenneth Lay reportedly sold substantial amounts of his Enron stock. In contrast, after
public disclosure of Enron's problems in the latter part of 2001 and the company's collapse, Enron
employees were prohibited from selling their Enron shares in their 401(k) plans because of a change
in plan administrator. Enron employees participating in the plans reportedly had an average of 62% of
their plan balances invested in Enron stock. See BOSTELMAN, DESKBOOK, supra note 66, at § 2:2.2.
71. As of December 31, 2000, Enron had nearly 13% of all its common shares outstanding under
stock option plans that apparently had no restrictions on the subsequent resale of the shares. See JOHN
C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 24 (2006).
72. See SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1997) (agreeing with SEC that amount
disgorged by officers who looted a corporation should be paid to the U.S. Treasury and not to the cor-
poration because the current owners purchased the corporation at a price reflecting the fraud).
73. SEC Director of Enforcement Stephen M. Cutler referred to this limitation as "technical." See
It's Only Fair: Returning Money to Defrauded Investors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets,
Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 7
(2003) (statement of Stephen M. Cutler, SEC Director of Enforcement), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/testimony/022603tssmc.htm.
74. SECTION 308(c) REPORT, supra note 3, at 33. This former alternative was included in the Securi-
ties Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2004, H.R. 475(l), 108th Cong. § 8(a) (2004),
available at 2004 WL 934533, which Congress did not enact.
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B. SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
In the five complete fiscal years since the enactment of SOX, the SEC has brought
from 218 to 335 judicial enforcement actions per year.75 It has obtained (in judi-
cial and administrative proceedings) orders requiring disgorgement of profits of
roughly $1.6 billion per year and penalties of roughly another $1.1 billion per
year.76 Many of the judicial actions that the SEC has highlighted as significant or
key cases or major accomplishments77 are financial fraud cases.7"
In addition, the SEC does not operate alone in these high-profile financial fraud
cases but instead engages in coordinated efforts with other regulators (states and
self-regulatory organizations79), prosecutors (U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ")
and state attorneys general), and the private plaintiffs' securities bar to maximize
the collection of funds for injured investors.80 For its part, the SEC has aggres-
sively employed section 308 in two ways to create sizable distribution funds for
investors harmed by corporate financial fraud. First, it has created distribution
funds without disgorgement of corporate profits as traditionally measured; and,
second, it has increased the amounts of corporate penalties. This part critically ex-
amines some of these actions and concludes by questioning whether the SEC's
advantages as a plaintiff in enforcement actions make sense in the context of
section 308 actions.
75. In addition, the SEC can bring administrative proceedings against broker dealers, associated
persons, and regulated entities. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-2 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007). The number of
proceedings for each fiscal year is as follows (numbers in parentheses show civil injunction actions
first, administrative proceedings second): FY03-636 (271, 365); FY04--639 (264,375); FY05-629
(335, 294); FY06-574 (218, 356); FY07-656 (262, 394). The numbers are from the SEC's Annual
Reports, Performance and Accountability Reports ("PARs"), and Select SEC and Market Data for the
applicable years. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, About the SEC, http://www.sec.gov/
about.shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
76. Disgorgement amounts by fiscal year: $900 million (FY03); $1.9 billion (FY04); $1.6 billion
(FY05); $2.3 billion (FY06); $1.093 billion (FY07). Penalties: $1.1 billion (FY03); $1.2 billion (FY04);
$1.5 billion (FY05); $975 million (FY06); $507 million (FY07). Id.
77. In each Annual Report or PAR, the SEC highlights certain cases as significant or key cases or
major accomplishments. Although it does not set forth its criteria for selecting these cases, the SEC
appears to include high-profile cases in terms of publicity and monetary relief. See id.
78. Enron and Xerox were identified in the 2003 Annual Report, 2003 REPORT, supra note 7, at 16;
Computer Associates and Lucent Technologies in the 2004 Performance and Accountability Report,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 6 (2004) [hereinafter "2004
PAR"], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar.shtml; Qwest Communications, Time Warner,
and Adelphia in the 2005 PAR, supra note 7, at 7-8; McAfee, AIG, Fannie Mae, and Tyco in the 2006
PAR, supra note 7, at 8-9; and Mercury Interactive, ConAgra, and Cardinal Health in the 2007
Performance and Accountability Report, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNT-
ABiLTY REPORT 6 (2007) [hereinafter "2007 PAR"], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2007.
shtml.
79. The self-regulatory organizations are principally the exchanges on which stock is traded.
80. See Deborah Solomon, For Wronged Investors, It's Payback Time-The SEC Begins Doling Out
Funds from Settlement Pools, but the Wait Can Be Long, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2005, at DI (reporting that
the SEC pairs Fair Funds with related class action settlements whenever possible to save time and
money).
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1. Disgorgement. In enforcement actions against third parties (e.g., investment
banks81 and accounting firms82) for aiding and abetting corporate fraud, at least
some portion of the firms' fees, consistent with the disgorgement remedy, can be
designated as ill-gotten gains, and penalties paid by the firm can be included in a
Fair Fund in accordance with section 308. In addition, in actions against corpo-
rate insiders, some portion of their compensation, particularly performance-based
bonuses as well as any profits derived from trading in the company's securities
while the fraud was ongoing, 3 can, consistent with the equitable remedy of dis-
gorgement, be designated as ill-gotten gains, permitting penalties paid by the in-
siders to be added to a Fair Fund.
A corporate defendant, however, does not experience what has traditionally
been considered ill-gotten gains in the absence of sales of its own securities.84
81. See, e.g., SEC Charges J.P Morgan Chase in Connection with Enron's Accounting Fraud,
Litigation Release No. 18252 (July 28, 2003) (noting that the firm paid a total of $135 million in
disgorgement, penalties, and interest in connection with Enron-related misconduct), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleaseslr18252.htm; In re Citigroup, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48230
(July 28, 2003) (announcing firm paid $52.750 million in disgorgement and $48.5 million as a
penalty for Enron-related misconduct; firm paid $9.750 million in disgorgement and $9 million in
penalty for Dynergy-related misconduct); available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48230.
htm; SEC Charges Merrill Lynch, Four Merrill Lynch Executives with Aiding and Abetting Enron
Accounting Fraud; Merrill Lynch Simultaneously Settles Charges for Permanent Anti-Fraud Injunction
and Payment of $80 Million in Disgorgement, Penalties and Interest, Litigation Release No. 18038
(Mar. 17, 2003) (publicizing that firm paid $37.5 million in disgorgement, $5 million in interest, and
$37.5 million as a penalty in connection with Enron-related misconduct), available at http://www.sec.
govAitigation/litreleases/lr18038.htm.
82. See, e.g., KPMG Pays $22 Million To Settle SEC Litigation Relating to Xerox Audits, Litigation
Release No. 19191 (Apr. 19, 2005) (announcing that firm paid nearly $10 million in disgorgement,
over $2.5 million in interest, and $10 million as a penalty in connection with Xerox audit), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Iitigation/1itreleases/lr19191.htm. However, in the settlement paid by Deloitte &
Touche in connection with its audits of Adelphia, none of the $50 million obtained in judicial and
administrative proceedings was designated as disgorgement amounts. See In re Deloitte & Touche LLP,
Litigation Release No. 19202 (Apr. 26, 2005) (stating that $25 million was paid as a penalty to settle
a judicial proceeding and an additional $25 million was paid in a related administrative proceeding),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51606.pdf.
83. Xerox executives paid $22 million in disgorgement, interest, and penalties. See KPMG Pays
$22 Million To Settle SEC Litigation Relating to Xerox Audits, Litigation Release No. 19191 (Apr.
19, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Iitigation/litreleases/lr19191.htm. The SEC brought civil
actions against several Healthsouth Corp. executives for penalties, disgorgement, and interest. See SEC
Charges William T. Owens and Weston L. Smith in Connection with the Healthsouth Corp. Account-
ing Fraud; Commission Action Seeks Injunctions, Money Penalties, Officer and Director Bars, Litiga-
tion Release No. 18059 (Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.sec.govAitigation/litreleaseslr18059.
htm; see also SEC v. Owens, Litigation Release No. 19743 (June 28, 2006) (noting the former CFO of
Healthsouth Corp. paid approximately $16 million in disgorgement and interest but because of his fi-
nancial condition no penalty was required), available at http://www.sec.govIlitigationAitreleases/2006/
lr19743.htm; SEC v. Kumar, Litigation Release No. 18891 (Sept. 22, 2004) (announcing that the SEC
brought actions against Computer Associates insiders for disgorgement, interest, and penalties), avail-
able at http://www.sec.govAitigationAitreleases/Ir18891.htm. In the Kumar proceedings, the former
Computer Associates chief executive officer did not have to make any payments in the civil action
because of his obligation to make restitution payments of $798,600,000 in the criminal proceeding.
See Final Judgment Entered Against Defendant Sanjay Kumar, Litigation Release No. 20082 (Apr. 19,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Iitigation/Iitreleases/2007Ar20082.htm.
84. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline -- 63 Bus. Law.  329 2007-2008
330 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 63, February 2008
Accordingly, pursuant to section 308, in the absence of disgorgement of profits, a
corporate penalty cannot be distributed to investors.85 The SEC, however, has con-
sistently evaded section 308's limitation by including a nominal $1 disgorgement
amount to allow distribution of corporate penalties to investors .86 It has done this
even in cases where it may have been able to establish a disgorgement amount
under established principles.8 7 Corporate defendants apparently agree to this,
even though they might have an advantage in designating some amounts as dis-
gorgement instead of a penalty,8 and no court appears to have questioned this
practice.
2. Penalties. When the SEC settled an enforcement action against Xerox in
2002, shortly before the enactment of SOX, the $10 million civil penalty paid by
Xerox was the largest penalty the SEC had ever imposed on an issuer in a finan-
cial fraud action. 9 Shortly thereafter, a $10 million penalty seemed "antiquated"90
and, indeed, it was asserted, would constitute a success for the attorney represent-
ing the corporate defendant.9t In 2003, Worldcom paid a $2.25 billion penalty
85. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., SEC Charges Lucent Technologies Inc. and Ten Defendants for a $1.1 Billion Ac-
counting Fraud; Lucent Will Pay a $25 Million Penalty; Three Individuals Also Settle Securities Fraud
Charges, Litigation Release No. 18715 (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litre
leases/lrl8715.htm.
87. In SEC v. McAfee, for example, the SEC alleged in the complaint stock sales by the corporation
during the time of the fraud, but the settlement included only a $1 nominal disgorgement amount that
allowed the SEC to put the $50 million penalty into a Fair Fund. See Complaint at 20, SEC v. McAfee,
Inc., No. 06-009 (PJH) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.govAitigation/complaints/
comp19520.pdf; SEC Sues McAfee, Inc. for Accounting Fraud, McAfee Agrees To Settle and Pay a $50
Million Penalty, Litigation Release No. 19520 (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/itigationl/
litreleases/lr19520.htm.
88. The settlements provide that the penalty amounts cannot be offset against any amounts paid in
class action settlements. See, e.g., SEC Charges Time Warner with Fraud, Aiding and Abetting Fraud
by Others, and Violating a Prior Cease-and-Desist Order; CFO, Controller, and Deputy Controller
Charged with Causing Reporting Violations; Time Warner Agrees to $300 Million Penalty, Antifraud
Injunction and Order To Comply with Cease-and-Desist Order; Will Restate Its Financial Results and
Engage Independent Examiner; CFO, Controller and Deputy Controller Consent to Cease-and-Desist
Order, Litigation Release No. 19147 (Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter "Time Warner Litigation Release"],
available at http://www.sec.govAitigation/litreleases/lrl9147.htm. Pre-SOX case law allowed defen-
dants that disgorged profits in an SEC enforcement action to offset that amount against damages in
private litigation when the plaintiffs were seeking disgorgement of profits. See Litton Indus. Inc. v.
Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 734 E Supp. 1071, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that "once ill-gotten
gains have been disgorged to the SEC, there remains no unjust enrichment and, therefore, no basis for
further disgorgement in a private action"). Courts did not extend that offset to financial fraud actions,
however, where the investors' theory of damages was based on the inflated value of their securities. See
In re Spear & Jackson Sec. Litig., 399 E Supp. 2d 1350, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that disgorge-
ment of profits to the SEC and plaintiffs' securities fraud damages are different remedies). One com-
mentator argued that Fair Fund distributions should be taken into account in compensating investors
in class actions; see Kenneth M. Lehn, Commentary, Private Insecurities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at
A16, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI 13996764865374191 .html.
89. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Staff:
24th Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate & Securities Law Institute (Apr. 29, 2004), http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/spch042904smc.htm [hereinafter "Cutler Speech"].
90. Id.
91. See Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the U.S. Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform (Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch02l6O6psa.htm [here-
inafter "Atkins Remarks"].
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(discounted to $750 million because of its bankruptcy proceeding),92 and penal-
ties against other entities in the range of $50 million were not unusual.93 Business
interests criticized the escalating amounts of corporate penalties, 94 which resulted
in an intense debate about the SEC's use of its penalty powers against corporate
entities. 5 The SEC's reaction to this criticism is discussed in Part III.
Moreover, the increased penalty amounts and the distribution of these funds to
compensate investors create exactly the wealth transfer problems that Professor
Coffee and others argue is the principal flaw in securities fraud class actions. 96 The
effect is to take corporate funds away from one group of investors, the current
shareholders, and pay it to another group of investors, those who traded in the se-
curities during the class damages period. This can be described as "robbing Peter
to pay Paul" and is more complicated because there is some identity between the
two groups, so the result may even be "robbing Peter to pay Peter." If wealth trans-
fer problems make the federal securities class action a poor instrument to achieve
investor compensation, then section 308 actions raise the same objection.
3. Section 308 Actions. A careful examination of financial fraud settlements
against four corporate defendants-Worldcom, Time Warner, AIG, and Fannie
Mae-illustrates how the SEC's efforts to create Fair Fund distributions for inves-
tors have resulted in an evasion of the disgorgement requirement and the imposi-
tion of sizable penalties to the possible detriment of innocent stakeholders.
SEC v. Worldcom, Inc.97 The Worldcom settlement of "perhaps the largest ac-
counting fraud in history"98 produced the only appellate opinion to date in which
a court has discussed section 308. The district court approved the creation of a Fair
Fund of $2.25--discounted to $750 million because of Enron's bankruptcy (still
75 times greater than the previous largest financial fraud settlement)-of which
$500 million was paid in cash and the rest in common stock of the reorganized
corporation. 99 In reviewing the settlement, the district court framed the issue as
balancing the need to punish the corporation with the desire not to undermine the
possibility of the corporation emerging from bankruptcy as a viable company.100
The district court first addressed the amount of the penalty The numbers in
Worldcom illustrate the discrepancy between the shareholders' losses and the
92. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
93. See Cutler Speech, supra note 89.
94. See, e.g., Alix Nyberg Stuart, Penalty Box: The SEC Is Handing Out Bigger and Bigger Fines for
Misdeeds. But Is This the Right Approach?, CFO MAG., Feb. 1, 2006, at 79, available at http://www.cfo.
com/article.cfm/5435460/c_5461573?f=singlepage; see also Richard A. Spehr & Michelle J. Annun-
ziata, The Remedies Act Turns Fifteen: What Is Its Relevance Today?, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 587, 611 (2005)
(criticizing the SEC for failure to follow the penalty statute).
95. See infra Part Ill.
96. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1556-62. See also Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud
Class Action as We Know It, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 3 (2007) (arguing that in diversified portfolios inves-
tors will be both winners and losers with respect to investing in corporate securities violators).
97. 273 E Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The distribution plan was approved by the district court
in Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Worldcom, Inc. v. SEC, No. 02 Civ. 4963(JSR), 2004 WL
1621185 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004), affd, 467 E3d 73 (2d Cir. 2006).
98. Worldcom, Inc., 273 F Supp. 2d at 431.
99. Id. at 434-35.
100. See id. at 431, 433-34.
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corporation's gain. The court said that although the SEC could take the sharehold-
ers' losses (estimated by the plaintiffs in the class action litigation at "as much as
$200 billion") into account in determining the amount of the penalty, such losses
could not be the primary factor.10 Rather, the maximum amount of the penalty
was the corporate gain from the fraud,' 2 which the court estimated as $10-17 bil-
lion.10 3 The court did not state how it derived the $10-17 billion range; although,
since the court had previously stated that income was overstated by an estimated
$11 billion, 14 that overstatement may have been the source for the "corporate
gain." If this is correct, the court did not calculate the gain consistent with the
1990 Act's legislative history.15
Second, the SEC did not specify, and the court did not require, any disgorge-
ment amount apart from a nominal $1 to ensure the applicability of section 308.06
The court did not explain any discrepancy between it finding a "corporate gain"
for purposes of determining the amount under the penalty statute and its failure
to find more than a nominal disgorgement amount for purposes of section 308.
Worldcom thus set the pattern for subsequent settlements.
Worldcom's Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors challenged the SEC's
Fair Fund distribution plan as unfair and argued that the district court's review
of the settlement was too deferential to the SEC.0 7 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, however, rejected the plaintiffs argument that section 308
required the district court's independent review and held that the standard of
review for Fair Fund distribution plans was the "fair and reasonable" standard
previously adopted for pre-SOX disgorgement plans.10 8 More specifically, "so long
as the district court is satisfied that 'in the aggregate, the plan is equitable and rea-
sonable,"'' 09 it should defer to the SEC's expertise in determining how to distribute
the funds because "hard choices" have to be made with limited funds."0 The Sec-
ond Circuit also specifically found that the SEC did not have to follow bankruptcy
priorities."' The case thus illustrates the courts' and SEC's failure, in Fair Fund
101. Id. at 431,434.
102. This was apparently a reference to the penalty statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2000 & Supp. V
2005). See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
103. Worldcom, Inc., 273 F Supp. 2d at 434.
104. Id. at 431. In the same sentence, the court also referred to the balance sheet's overstatement
by more than $75 billion, see id., but that number does not appear to figure in the court's calculation
of corporate gain.
105. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
106. Worldcom had sold debt instruments during the period of the fraud, but there was apparently
no attempt to quantify the corporate gain in that sale resulting from the fraud. See SEC v. Worldcom,
Inc., First Amended Complaint, Civ. No. 02-CV-4963 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2002), http://www.sec.
govAitigation/complaints/comp17829.htm.
107. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Worldcom, Inc., 467 E3d at 75.
108. See id. at 82; see also SEC v. Wang, 944 F2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that district court
must only satisfy itself that SEC's disgorgement plan is "fair and reasonable").
109. Id. at 83 (quoting Wang, 944 E2d at 88).
110. Id. at 84 (quoting the district court's opinion). The appellate court, in turn, reviews the district
court's decision using an "abuse of discretion" standard. See id.
111. See id. at 84-85. For why bankruptcy priorities should be followed in Fair Fund cases, see
generally Zack Christensen, Note, The Fair Funds for Investors Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: Is It Unfair
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cases, to appreciate sufficiently the impact on other innocent stakeholders-in
this case the creditors who would otherwise have had bankruptcy priority.
In October 2006, the federal district court authorized the distribution agent to
begin distributions from the Worldcom fund; three cash distributions have been
made to eligible claimants, and a fourth is expected in 2008.112 An estimated
5.5-6% of eligible losses are expected to be paid. 1I3
SEC v. Time Warner"4 On March 21, 2005, Time Warner settled SEC charges
that from October 2000 through February 2003, the corporation materially over-
stated its online advertising revenue and the number of its Internet subscribers
and aided and abetted three other securities frauds, thus violating a May 2000
cease-and-desist order. 1 5 It agreed to pay a $300 million penalty 116 No publicly
available document explains how the $300 million penalty was calculated,"' and
there was no attempt to establish a "disgorgement" amount."I8 The distribution of
the Fair Fund was coordinated with the plan of allocation in a class action settle-
ment in a similar case. 119
SEC v. American International Group, Inc.'2° In February 2006, the SEC announced
settlement of charges that American International Group, Inc. ("AIG") fraudulently
to the Creditors of a Bankrupt Debtor?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 339. The district court that approved the
settlement, however, was cognizant of bankruptcy policy: "[wlhat the [SECI may not do, at least in a
case in which the company is in bankruptcy, is determine the size of the penalty primarily on the basis
of how much shareholder loss will thereby be recompensed, for this would not only be adverse to the
priorities established under the bankruptcy laws but also would run contrary to the primary purposes
of S.E.C. fraud penalties themselves." Worldcom, Inc., 273 F Supp. 2d at 434.
112. See Worldcom Victim Trust, http://wwwworldcomvictimtrust.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
113. Id.
114. Time Warner Litigation Release, supra note 88.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. The inflation of the bottom line was substantially in excess of $300 million. Id. As part of the
settlement, Time Warner agreed to reduce its reported online advertising revenues by approximately
$500 million in addition to the $190 million already restated. Id. The SEC presumably took into ac-
count the fact that Time Warner was a recidivist offender.
118. Time Warner agreed to pay $1 in disgorgement. SEC v. Time Warer, Inc., No. 1:05CV00578(GK)
(D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2005) (final judgment).
119. In settlement of the securities fraud class action, In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA
Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5575 (SKW) (S.D.N.Y. 2002), Time Warner agreed to ask the SEC to distribute the
$300 million penalty along with the class settlement, and the SEC agreed to do so. See AOL Time War-
ner Securities Litigation Settlement 19-20, http://www.aoltimewamersettlement.com/pdf/altwlstip.
pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2008). The relevant time period for the class of purchasers who received Fair
Fund distributions was shorter than the damages period in the class action settlement, the ninety-
day look-back cap on damages required by 15 U.S.C. section 78u-4(e)(1) (2000) and applied in the
class action settlement was not applicable to the Fair Fund distributions, and those who opted out
of the class action could file Fair Fund claims. See AOL Time Warner Securities Litigation Settlement,
httpJ/wwwaoltimewamersettlement.com/pdf/altwlstip.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2008). The fund also
included $150 million from a DOJ settlement. Id. at 19. Distribution of the fund commenced on
July 13, 2007. See AOL Time Warner Securities Litigation Settlement, July 16 Update, http://www.
aoltimewamersettlement.com (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
120. SEC v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19560 (Feb. 9, 2006) [hereinafter "AIG
Litigation Release"], available at http://www.sec.govAitigationAitreleases/lr19560.htm. This was part of
a global settlement with the New York Attorney General, the New York Superintendent of Insurance,
and the DOJ. Id.
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improved its financial results in the amount of $2.26 billion. 2' Unlike World-
com and Time Warner, a portion of AIG's settlement payments-$700 million-
was designated as disgorgement, while another $100 million was paid as a civil
penalty 2 2 The $700 million disgorgement amount can be deduced mathemati-
cally AIG entered into three transactions allegedly for the sole purpose of improv-
ing its financial bottom line-two transactions that added $500 million in phony
loss reserves and another transaction that concealed $200 million in underwriting
losses. 123 However, if these constitute "ill-gotten gains," then any company's infla-
tion of the bottom line could constitute ill-gotten gains, a view not previously
advanced by the SEC. 24 This novel view of disgorgement may have stemmed from
the agency's desire to create a substantial fund for distribution to investors, while
keeping the amount designated as a penalty relatively low to reflect the SEC's new
Financial Penalties policy 25 and AIG's substantial cooperation in the investiga-
tion. 26 Thus, by creative reasoning, the SEC reduced what could have otherwise
been a heavier penalty and yet provided a substantial fund for investors. The com-
pany paid the money into a fund to be available to resolve shareholders' claims
against the company.127 The funds have not yet been distributed. 28
SEC v. Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae").'29 On May 23,
2006, the SEC settled an enforcement action charging Fannie Mae with a six-year
financial fraud to create the misleading appearance of stable earnings growth. 3 °
If the SEC had, in AIG,13 ' been developing novel theories to designate payments
as disgorgement, it did not continue the experiment in Fannie Mae. Although the
SEC alleged specifically in the complaint that, in 1998, the accounting fraud was
carried out to maximize executives' bonuses, 2 the entire $400 million payment
was designated as a corporate penalty 13 3 The Distribution Plan was approved in




124. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
126. AIG Litigation Release, supra note 120, AIG was also a recidivist. See Complaint at 2-3, SEC v.
Am. Int'l Group, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2006) (providing details about two recently
settled SEC actions with AIG that involved substantial penalties and disgorgement), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl9560.pdf.
127. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 19 (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012307003026/y27490elOvk.htm.
128. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 15 (Nov. 7, 2007), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012307015058/y38903elOvg.htm.
129. Fannie Mae To Pay $400 Million Penalty for Accounting Fraud, SEC and OFHEO Settle Ac-
tion Against Fannie Mae, Litigation Release No. 19710 (May 23, 2006) [hereinafter "Fannie Mae Liti-
gation Release"], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2006/lr19710.htm.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
132. Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, No. 1:06CV00959 (RBW) (D.D.C. May 23,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19710.pdf.
133. Fannie Mae Litigation Release, supra note 129.
134. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Announces Start of $357 Million Fair
Fund Distribution Process in Fannie Mae Settlement (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news
press/2007/2007-81.htm [hereinafter "Fannie Mae Press Release"].
HeinOnline -- 63 Bus. Law.  334 2007-2008
Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors? 335
thereafter.' 5 In an apparent response to criticisms about SEC delays in making
distributions in other cases, 36 Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director of the SEC's
Division of Enforcement, announced: "[tihis expeditious distribution process il-
lustrates the Commission's continuing commitment to improving the speed with
which funds are returned to defrauded investors in SEC enforcement actions."137
These four settlements support the suspicion that the SEC is reacting to pres-
sure to negotiate large funds for distribution to investors at the expense of any
coherent policy on disgorgement and penalties and with an underappreciation of
the consequences for a corporation's innocent stakeholders-the current share-
holders or, in the case of Worldcom, its creditors.
4. The SEC as Plaintiff. In recovering funds for investors, the SEC has impor-
tant advantages over private plaintiffs because it is not encumbered by the re-
strictions that the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed on private plaintiffs in Rule
10b-5 actions. The SEC does not need to be a purchaser or seller,'-" does not have
to establish reliance'39 or loss causation,' 40 and can bring actions against aiders
and abettors. t4 ' The agency is not subject to the same statute of limitations as
private plaintiffs. 42 In addition, investors can receive more in Fair Fund distribu-
tions than in class action settlements because the SEC takes the position that the
ninety-day look-back cap on damages required by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act ("PSLRA") does not apply to Fair Fund distributions 43 and attorney's
fees do not reduce the amount available for Fair Fund distributions. 44 Finally, ac-
cording to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 45 Fair Fund
135. Id. Payments began in October 2007 and will amount to approximately 3.9% of eligible loss
amounts. See SEC Fannie Mae Settlement Fund, Recent Settlement Events, http://www.secfanniemae
settlement.com/events.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
136. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
137. Fannie Mae Press Release, supra note 134.
138. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737-38 (1975) (holding that only
a purchaser or seller of securities can bring a private action under Rule 10b-5).
139. In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court estab-
lished that reliance is an element in all private Rule lOb-5 actions. 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008).
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000). Loss causation became a substantial obstacle for private
plaintiffs after Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-46 (2005). See Oscar Private
Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecomm., Inc., 487 E3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2007).
141. After the U.S. Supreme Court held in Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Den-
ver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994), that there was no aiding and abetting liability under Rule lob-5,
Congress amended the Exchange Act to allow the SEC to bring aiding and abetting claims. See Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2000)).
142. No private action can be brought later than the earlier of two years after the discovery of the
facts constituting the violation or five years after such violation. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2000 & Supp. V
2005). There is a five-year statute of limitations when the government seeks enforcement of any civil
fine, penalty, or forfeiture. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2000). See also SEC v. Jones, 476 F Supp. 2d 374,
381 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the statute is applicable to "civil penalties and equitable relief that
seekil to punish" but not to equitable relief that "seeks to remedy a past wrong or protect the public
from future harm").
143. See supra note 119.
144. See Atkins Remarks, supra note 91 (stating that "[the SEC does] not allow any of the funds
from the SEC actionis] to be paid to private lawyers").
145. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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distributions are not subject to the bankruptcy priorities that would otherwise
eliminate many investors' recoveries from a bankrupt corporation.
To the extent that the SEC's role is to be a surrogate for private parties rather than
an enforcement agency, these distinctions may appear untenable, and defendants
may argue that the restrictions applicable to private party litigation should apply to
the SEC as well.'46 While, to date, Fair Fund distributions have been the product
of settlement, at some point an aggressive corporate defendant's attorney may de-
cide to press this argument. How the courts respond to this argument may depend
on whether any dislike of securities fraud class actions stems from their view of
the plaintiffs as unworthy plaintiffs,141 their distaste for plaintiffs' securities attor-
neys' 48 or their concerns about innocent shareholders of corporate defendants.1
49
Moreover, it is a valid question of policy whether investors should be able to
receive money from Fair Fund distributions that they cannot obtain in private ac-
tions. The SEC does limit the eligibility of claimants in the distribution plans to
conform to some of the legal restrictions on class action plaintiffs; thus, eligible
claimants have been defined as purchasers and sellers, 5 ' and the distribution
plans take loss causation into account in calculating to what extent price infla-
tion is attributable to the defendant's misrepresentations.'' While this lacks some
transparency, it may be no different than how these issues are addressed in settled
class actions.
In the case of aiders and abettors, however, an SEC policy of negotiating large
penalties in order to compensate investors raises some of the same policy con-
cerns that the U.S. Supreme Court found so troubling in Central Bank of Denver
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver N.A.' 52 The Court noted that the uncertainty
of the governing rules regarding aiding and abetting liability could lead entities
to settle claims of dubious merit and could even cause professionals to price their
services beyond the ability of small and new businesses to pay" '1 While the Court
was addressing the dangers of private litigation, the concerns are similarly rel-
evant to SEC enforcement actions where the SEC has the power and the incen-
tive to exact a large penalty After Central Bank, Congress determined that the
SEC (but not private parties) should have the power to bring aiding and abetting
146. See Ellsworth, supra note 3, at 650.
147. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 273 E Supp. 2d 351, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that
"Itlhe record clearly reveals that plaintiffs were among the high-risk speculators who, knowing full
well or being properly chargeable with appreciation of the unjustifiable risks they were undertaking in
the extremely volatile and highly untested stocks at issue, now hope to twist the federal securities laws
into a scheme of cost-free speculators' insurance"), affd sub nor. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.,
396 E2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 935 (2005).
148. See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 903, 946 (2002) (noting that
rhetoric of some judicial opinions suggests disdain for plaintiffs' attorneys).
149. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
150. The Worldcom distribution plan excluded "holders' claims." See SEC v. Worldcom, Inc.,
No. 02-CV-4963 (JSR), 2004 WL 1621185, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004).
151. See SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., Civ: No. 02-CV-4963 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) (further order
approving distribution plan), available at http://www.worldcomvictimtrust.com/Downloads/Distribu
tionPlan.pdf.
152. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
153. Id. at 189.
HeinOnline -- 63 Bus. Law.  336 2007-2008
Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors? 337
actions for Rule 10b-5 violations,"14 which, coupled with section 308, confers on
the agency the broad authority to bring actions against deep-pocket defendants
on behalf of investors. Perhaps Congress had confidence that the agency, unlike
private parties, was less likely to bring unmeritorious claims. The U.S. Supreme
Court recently acknowledged the distinction between SEC and private actions
and specifically referred to the SEC's power to collect damages for investors as a
reason why "[t]he enforcement power is not toothless.""15 The fact that the law
treats private parties and the SEC differently, however, explains, but does not nec-
essarily rationalize, the anomalous results.
Il. BUSINESS COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO SECTION 308
As the SEC has vigorously employed section 308 to collect funds for defrauded
investors, section 308 has become an instrument in the business community's
campaign against securities fraud class action litigation. The securities industry
and other constituencies hostile to private securities fraud litigation, in amici
briefs filed to restrict private remedies in recent years, have cited section 308
as an example of why private securities fraud litigation is a costly duplication of
the SEC's efforts.5 6 President Bush reportedly expressed the view that the scope
of private shareholders' litigation should not be expanded because of the ability
of regulators to bring enforcement actions,17 and the President of the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association ("SIFMA") captured that sentiment
when he stated that expansion of private remedies is unwarranted because regula-
tors have the tools to return money to investors. 158 The U.S. Supreme Court in
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. referred to the SEC's
power to collect from investors as a policy reason not to extend private parties'
ability to recover from outside actors. 5 9 Academic commentators 6o and the SEC
154. See supra note 141.
155. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 773 (2008).
156. An illustrative example:
"The SEC's broad powers and lengthy record of pursuing wrongdoers and returning funds to inves-
tors further belie.., the argument that the government is 'ill-equipped' to enforce the securities laws on
a large scale.... The FAIR Funds provision's sponsor sought to compensate investors without incurring
the high legal fees associated with private class-action litigation...." Brief for the Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association and the Futures Industry Association as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 25-26, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008)
(No. 06-43). Similar language is found in the Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets As-
sociation (SIFMA) and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (Chamber of Com-
merce) as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
432 F2d 588 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W 3349 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2007) (No. 06-484), and in
the Brief of the Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 27, Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
157. See CarrieJohnson, Bush Weighs in Against Investors in Fraud Case, WASH. PosrJune 13, 2007, at DI.
158. See Press Release, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, SIFMA Opposes Third-Party Class Action
Lawsuits (June 13, 2007), http://www.sifma.org/news/46297159.shtml.
159. 128 S. Ct. 761, 773 (2008).
160. Professor Coffee sets forth statistics comparing private and SEC actions and recoveries to
demonstrate that "private enforcement seems to dwarf public enforcement." Coffee, supra note 4, at 1543.
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itself,161 however, do not believe that the SEC's expanded powers make private
litigation superfluous. First, the SEC does not and never will have the necessary
resources to investigate and bring enforcement actions against every securities
violator, much less pursue every enforcement action that may result in recovery
for investors. 62 Second, as discussed in Part IV, the SEC has important enforce-
ment goals other than compensating investors.
Two recent reports that express alarm over the anti-competitive effect of U.S.
securities regulation raise a related, though more limited, argument and advocate
that amounts paid by corporations in Fair Fund distributions should be offset
against damages obtained by investors in private litigation. 163 Otherwise, they as-
sert, there is the possibility of a "wasteful double-recovery by shareholders that
would undermine the original purpose of Section 308 by permitting overcompen-
sation and, likewise, over-deterrence."' 64 In the financial fraud cases like World-
com, however, the shareholders' losses greatly exceed the settlement amounts,' 65
so the possibility of double recovery is exceedingly remote. Moreover, before the
enactment of SOX, courts established that payments to shareholders from all
sources cannot exceed the shareholders' losses.'
66
Finally, Republican sponsors of SOX and Paul Atkins, the SEC Commissioner
most closely identified with the pro-business agenda, have asserted that actions
under section 308 provide better value than private securities fraud suits because
investors' recoveries are not reduced by attorney's fees. 167 The significance of this
Professors Cox and Thomas said, "[hlere we have cause to find the obvious: the SEC cannot and does
not prosecute all violations and the private suit picks up the slack." Cox & Thomas, supra note 12,
at 779.
161. SECTION 308(c) REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.
162. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 757.
163. See COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 88-90 (Mar. 2007) [hereinafter "CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT"I, available at http://www.
uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/eozwwssfrqzdm3hd5siogqhp6h2ngxwdpr77qw2bogptzvi5we
u6mmi4plfq6xic7kjonfpg4q2bpks6ryog5wwh5sc/0703capmarkets full. pdf. The Commission is an in-
dependent, bipartisan committee established by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Id. at 1. For the other re-
port, see COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS
REGULATION 82 (Nov. 30, 2006) [hereinafter "INTERIM CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT"], available at http://www.
capmktsreg.org/pdfs/I 1.30Committee-Interim ReportREV2.pdf. Established by Secretary of the U.S.
Treasury Henry M. Paulson, Jr., the Committee is an independent, bipartisan committee composed of
twenty-two corporate and financial leaders. See id. at vii.
164. INTERIM CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 163, at 82. Similarly, the Capital Markets Report
expresses a need to avoid a potential "doubling" of the costs for each violation and to avoid the "du-
plicate investor compensation problem." CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 163, at 88-89. See also
Lehn, supra note 88, at A16.
165. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., SEC v. Risman, 7 F App'x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that disgorgement payments
made to victims cannot duplicate payments already made in criminal restitution proceedings).
167. See Atkins Remarks, supra note 91. See alsojonathan Peterson, Corporate Fraud Fund on Track, Of-
ficials Say; $2.6Billion Collectedforlnvestors, Cn. TRIB., Sept. 28, 2004, at Cl (quoting Rep. Oxleysaying,"[w]hen
corporate executives make out like bandits, the money ought to go back to the investors, not to trial law-
yers"); Rep. Richard Baker, The Election and Your 401 (k), NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Nov. 2, 2006), http://article.
nationalreview.com?q=YzBmZWRhZmRhOTUyYjU 1ZGUyMTNkNGU4MTkwZWU LYWI=#moret
(contrasting SEC's collections under the Fair Fund provision with "runaway litigation" and criticizing
Milberg Weiss); Ted Frank, Opinion, 'Arbitrary and Unfair,' WALL ST. J., May 31, 2007, at A14 (the author,
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advantage to investors, however, is diminished if, as is likely, securities plain-
tiffs' attorneys have greater incentives than government attorneys to negotiate a larger
amount because their compensation depends on it. Professor Coffee sets forth
statistics showing that defendants pay much more in securities class action settle-
ments than in public monetary sanctions. 16
Simultaneous with the business community's support for section 308, there has
been substantial criticism of the dramatic increase in the size of the SEC's corpo-
rate penalties in the post-Enron era, both for the agency's failure to set forth a con-
sistent policy and also for its insufficient appreciation for the impact of penalties
on current shareholders.169 As a result, in January 2006, the SEC issued a State-
ment Concerning Financial Penalties (the "Statement"), 70 stating the "fundamen-
tal principle" that corporate penalties are a necessary component of an effective
enforcement program as they "contribute[] to the Commission's ability to achieve
an appropriate level of deterrence.""'i' Yet, relying heavily on the 1990 Act's leg-
-islative history, the SEC recognized that if the shareholders did not benefit from
the fraud, imposition of a penalty on the corporation worked a hardship on the
shareholders. 72 Following from that realization, the SEC stated that the appropri-
ateness of a corporate penalty turns principally on two considerations: the "pres-
ence or absence of a direct benefit to the corporation as a result of the violation"
and the "degree to which the penalty will recompense or further harm the injured
shareholders."" 3 The SEC also listed other factors it would take into account,
including the "need to deter the particular type of offense," the "extent of the
injury to innocent parties," "whether complicity in the violation is widespread
throughout the corporation," the "level of intent on the part of the perpetrators,"
the "degree of difficulty in detecting the particular type of offense," the "presence
or lack of remedial steps by the corporation," and the "extent of cooperation with
[the] Commission and other law enforcement." 74
resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, says; "[olne can help investors without paying
billions to the likes of Mr. Lerach").
168. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1542-43.
169. As expressed by SEC Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, "I cannot justify imposing penalties
indirectly on shareholders whose investments have already lost value as a result of the fraud. Our use
of so-called Fair Funds... leads to the anomalous result that we have shareholders paying corporate
penalties that end up being returned to them through a Fair Fund-minus distribution expenses."
See Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Commissioner: SEC in
Transition: What We've Done and What's Ahead (June 15, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch061505cag.htm. See also Stuart, supra note 94, at 81 (quoting former SEC Commissioner Joseph
Grundfest that in some cases "these fines punish the victims twice," particularly if those responsible
for the violations have been removed).
170. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm




174. Id. In April 2007, Chairman Cox confirmed that, effective January 2007, SEC enforcement
attorneys were required to get pre-approval from the Commission before initiating settlement nego-
tiations that might result in a corporate penalty See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Speech by SEC Chairman: Address to the Mutual Fund Directors Forum; Seventh Annual
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These principles are generally consistent with the factors set forth in the 1990
Act's legislative history, except that the SEC omitted one factor and introduced
another. The Statement does not address the congressional comment that if there
are criminal violations, civil penalties may not be necessary;' 75 the SEC frequently
brings enforcement actions and collects penalties against defendants who also
pay criminal penalties. 7 ' By introducing a new factor-"[the presence of an opportu-
nity to use the penalty as a meaningful source of compensation to injured shareholders
is a factor in support of its imposition"'77-the SEC acknowledged that section 308
could provide an incentive for larger penalties. The SEC did not, however, give
any indication of how it would resolve the tension between compensating injured
investors and avoiding harm to innocent shareholders.
It is still too soon to determine the effect on corporate penalties of the Statement
and the requirement that SEC enforcement attorneys seek approval from the Com-
mission before commencing negotiations that are likely to include a corporate pen-
alty.t7 8 Although it was generally expected that the Statement and the requirement.
of Commission approval would result in lower corporate penalties, Chairman Cox
denied that this was the intent. 179 The largest corporate penalty in post-Statement
financial fraud settlements was $50 million, paid by Freddie Mac to settle what the
SEC described as a four-year, "multi-billion dollar accounting fraud." 8 While this
is a large penalty, it is significantly less than previous corporate penalties in high-
profile cases.' 8' The volume of high penalty financial fraud cases was down in
fiscal year 2007.182 Frustratingly, the SEC releases do not typically provide much
explanation for calculation of the amount of the penalty"83 In all instances of fi-
nancial fraud cases that settled with corporate penalties, the corporation paid no
Policy Conference (Apr. 13, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch041207cc.htm [herein-
after "Cox Address"].
175. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., AIG Litigation Release, supra note 120.
177. SEC Financial Penalties Press Release, supra note 170 (emphasis added).
178. See Cox Address, supra note 174.
179. Id.
180. Freddie Mac and Four Former Accounting Executives Settle SEC Enforcement Action in Con-
nection with Multi-Billion Dollar Accounting Fraud, Litigation Release No. 20304 (Sept. 27, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigationlitreleases/2007/Ar20304.htm.
181. See supra notes 97-137 and accompanying text.
182. 2007 PAR, supra note 78, at 15, 18.
183. In 2007, the SEC settled, in addition to Freddie Mac, eight financial fraud cases that in-
cluded corporate penalties. See MBIA To Pay $50 Million To Settle Securities Fraud Charges for Misuse
of Reinsurance Contracts, Litigation Release No. 19982 (Jan. 29, 2007) ($50 million penalty; SEC
stated that it elected not to apply SEC's new policy on corporate penalties because the settlement
was negotiated before its release), available at http://www.sec.govAitigation/titreleases/2007/lr19982.
htm; SEC Charges ConAgra Foods, Inc. in Financial Fraud and Accounting Case; ConAgra Agrees To
Pay $45 Million Penalty To Settle Charges, Litigation Release No. 20206 (July 25, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20206.htm; Nortel Network Pays $35 Million To Settle
Financial Fraud Charges, Litigation Release No. 20333 (Oct. 15, 2007) ($35 million penalty; SEC ac-
knowledged the company's "substantial remedial efforts and cooperation," which presumably reduced
the penalty), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007lr20333.htm; SEC Sues Cardi-
nal Health, Inc. for Fraudulent Earnings and Management Revenue Scheme, Litigation Release No.
20212 (July 26, 2007) ($35 million penalty; SEC acknowledged the company's "cooperation," which
presumably reduced the penalty), available at http://www.sec.govAitigation/litreleases/2007/lr20212.
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disgorgement amounts (in excess of $1), and the SEC announced its intention to
create a Fair Fund to distribute the penalty to investors.',
IV. ASSESSING THE SEC's MISSION IN LIGHT OF SECTION 308
A. THE SEC's AND THE JUDICIARY'S VIEW
OF THE AGENCY'S MISSION
Protecting investors by enforcing compliance with the securities laws has been
an important part of the SEC's mission, while obtaining compensation for inves-
tors historically has not.'85 While Chairman Cox"s6 and SEC Directors of Enforce-
ment 1 87 have pointed with pride to the large amounts the SEC has allocated to
Fair Fund distributions, the agency has resisted any suggestion that section 308
changes its mission in any fundamental way Moreover, neither the SEC'8 nor
the judiciary has recognized the possibility that there could be a conflict between
enforcing securities laws and compensating investors.
Congress included in section 308 a requirement that the SEC review its enforce-
ment proceedings involving collection of money for the five years preceding the
enactment of SOX and report its findings.18 9 Congressional concern likely stemmed
from a U.S. General Accountability Office ("GAO") report, issued the same month
htm; Reinsurer Settles Accounting Fraud Case Involving Sham Reinsurance Transaction, Litigation
Release No. 19989 (Feb. 6, 2007) ($15 million penalty; SEC stated that it elected not to apply the
new policy because the settlement was negotiated before its release), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/20071r19989.htm; SEC v. Nicor Inc., Litigation Release No. 20060 (Mar. 29, 2007)
($10 million penalty), available at http://www.sec.govAitigationAitreleases/2007/lr2OO60.htm; SEC v.
Tenet Healthcare Corp., Litigation Release No. 20067 (Apr. 2, 2007) ($10 million penalty), available
at http://www.sec.gov/itigation/litreleases/2007/1r20067.htm; First BanCorp Settles Financial Fraud
Charges with SEC and Agrees To Pay $8.5 Million Penalty, Litigation Release No. 20227 (Aug. 7, 2007)
($8.5 million penalty), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/itreleases/2007/Ar20227.htm.
184. See id.
185. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Commissioner Cynthia Glassman, in contrast, thought
Fair Fund distributions of corporate penalties were "form over substance." See supra note 169.
187. For example, Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, said,
"'[wlith this distribution, the Commission will have distributed over $2 billion in Fair Fund monies since
the 2002 passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, demonstrating our continued resolve to return money to in-
jured investors where appropriate.'" Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Announces $316 Mil-
lion Fair Fund Distribution to Investors Harmed by Fraud at Time Warner (July 9, 2007), http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-131.htm; see also Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks Before the District of Columbia Bar Association
(Feb. 11, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch0211O4smc.htm.
188. Although Commissioner Atkins has previously spoken approvingly of Fair Fund distribu-
tions, see supra note 91, more recently he gave a speech in which he expressed concern that the SEC
"may become an extension of the plaintiffs' bar, with similar philosophy and tactics." Paul S. Atkins,
Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Commissioner: The SEC's Role in Globalization
of the Capital Markets (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch101607psa.htm.
189. Specifically, the SEC was to "identify areas where such proceedings may be utilized to ef-
ficiently, effectively, and fairly provide restitution for injured investors," section 308, supra note 5, as
well as to review and analyze "other methods to more efficiently, effectively, and fairly provide resti-
tution to injured investors, including methods to improve the collection rates for civil penalties and
disgorgemenis," SOX § 308(c)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 7246(c)(1)(B) (Supp. V 2005). The required report
was also to "include a discussion of regulatory or legislative actions that are recommended or that may
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that SOX was enacted, that was critical of the SEC's efforts to collect and distrib-
ute disgorged funds."9 In its review, the SEC outlined its agenda and set forth
its priorities-swift enforcement actions ("real time" enforcement) and emergency
measures like temporary restraining orders, asset freezes, and the appointment of
receivers that are used both to shut down frauds and to increase the chances of
returning funds to investors.'91 The SEC also asserted the need for aggressive asser-
tion of disgorgement claims so that civil penalties could be added to the funds.192 It
expressed no conflict between its enforcement and collection efforts. 193
Two years later, however, in its 2004-2009 Strategic Plan, the SEC subtly de-
emphasized the importance of collecting funds for investors when it set forth its
vision, mission, and strategic goals for the next five years. It described its mission
as threefold: "t]o protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets;
and facilitate capital formation."1 94 To this end, it articulated four goals: enforce
compliance with federal securities laws, sustain an effective and flexible regulatory
environment, encourage and promote informed investment decision-making, and
maximize use of SEC resources. '9 It did not explicitly identify returning money
to defrauded investors as part of its mission or goals. Rather, consistent with the
SEC's traditional view, collecting money on behalf of defrauded investors remains
a subsidiary function of the agency
While judicial scrutiny of section 308 is limited, courts share the SEC's view.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of Worldcom, Inc. v. SEC, rejected the plaintiffs argument that section 308
worked a "sea change" in the SEC's powers and responsibilities and changed its
focus from deterrence to compensation. 196 To the contrary, in the view of the court,
the Fair Fund provision merely increased the funds available for distribution at
the SEC's discretion, it did not alter the SEC's discretion to determine whether to
distribute funds and how to distribute them.' 9
Thus, neither the SEC nor the courts have addressed whether increased efforts
to collect money on behalf of investors has any distorting effect on the agency's
selection of enforcement cases. The next part turns to this question.
B. THE BIGGER PICTURE
The difficulty in tackling this question is that beyond global statements, the SEC
provides little elaboration as to the implementation of its mission and goals. Indeed,
be necessary to address concerns identified in the study" SOX § 308(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7246(c)(2)
(Supp. V 2005).
190. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, SEC ENFORCEMENT:
MORE ACnONs NEEDED To IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF DISGORGEMENT COLLECTIONS (GAO-02-771) (July 2002),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO2771.pdf.
191. SECnION 308(c) REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23.
192. Id. at 23-24.
193. It acknowledged the costs involved in creating and administering distribution plans, id. at
23-24, as well as the need to improve collection rates. Id.
194. STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 1, at 4.
195. Id. at 3.
196. 467 E3d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 2006).
197. Id.
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a recent congressional study criticized the SEC because it had "no mechanism
for designating a case as critically important" 98 and recommended that the SEC
establish standards for assessing the importance of enforcement actions.19 Ac-
cordingly, although we can theorize about a conflict between the deterrence and
compensation functions of the SEC, it is hard to assess whether there actually
is a conflict without a better understanding of the process the agency uses to
determine enforcement priorities." °° The SEC states that its policy is that it must
ensure that enforcement actions are not over-or underrepresented in the areas
it regulates-no more than 40% in any one category-so as to maintain a "pres-
ence" in every area it regulates.20' In recent years, the SEC has devoted a substan-
tial amount of its resources to high-profile areas like insider trading and financial
fraud and has emphasized "real-time enforcement." Accordingly, it describes its
enforcement policy as follows:
The SEC seeks to detect problems in the securities markets, prevent and deter viola-
tions of federal securities law, and alert investors to possible wrong-doing. When
violations occur, the SEC aims to take prompt action to halt the misconduct, sanction
wrongdoers effectively and, where possible, return funds to harmed investors."2 2
Beyond this, the fullest explanation comes not from the agency itself but from a
GAO report that investigated human resources issues at the agency:
[The] SEC generally prioritizes the cases in terms of (1) the message delivered to
the industry and public about the reach of [the] SEC's enforcement efforts, (2) the
amount of investor harm done, (3) the deterrent value of the action, and (4) [the]
SEC's visibility in certain areas such as insider trading and financial fraud.203
There are a few principles to determining what constitutes an effective enforce-
ment program. Most fundamentally, the SEC, as an agency with limited resources, has
to make hard choices about the optimal use of its resources to enforce the securi-
ties laws. The SEC should continue to bring high-profile cases involving firms
198. MINORITY STAFF OF THE U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE AND THE U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
1 IOTH CONG., THE FIRING OF AN SEC ArTORNEY AND THE INVESTIGATION OF PEQUOT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 7
(Comm. Print 2007), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202007/36960.pdf.
199. Id.
200. Some indication that there is a problem is the fact that enforcement did not meet its 2007
performance measure for the number of first enforcement actions filed within two years of opening
an investigation. The reasons given were that there was a higher percentage of complex cases involv-
ing issuer reporting and disclosure and significant resources were devoted to the distribution of Fair
Funds. 2007 PAR, supra note 78, at 27.
201. 2006 PAR, supra note 7, at 11. "The Division of Enforcement aims to maintain an enforcement
presence in each of the areas within its jurisdiction, while concentrating on particular problem areas."
Ralph C. Ferrara & Philip S. Khinda, SEC Enforcement Proceedings: Strategic Considerations for when the
Agency Comes Calling, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 1143, 1146 (1999).
202. 2006 PAR, supra note 7, at 6.
203. U.S. GEN. AccOUNTING OFFICE, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT
MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S.
SENATE, HUMAN CAPITAL: MAJOR HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES AT SEC AND KEY TRADE AGENCIES (GAO-02-
662T) 6 (Apr. 23, 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02662t.pdf.
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with large market capitalization in order to send a strong deterrence message."
It would be unthinkable if the SEC did not bring actions against the Enrons and
the Worldcoms, even though these companies will also be the targets of private
plaintiffs. The SEC, however, must also continue to bring enforcement actions
against small market capitalization companies; since cases against these compa-
nies are unlikely to result in a sizable financial recovery, private parties are unlikely to
file suits and there is a danger of insufficient deterrence if the SEC does not police
them. Finally, the SEC plays an important role in shutting down Ponzi or other
blatant frauds to prevent harm to the most unsophisticated investors. In many
of these cases, there is not a great likelihood of recovering funds. It would not,
however, be acceptable federal policy to cut back on protecting the most vulner-
able of investors.
205
The SEC should also bring more enforcement actions against individuals who
violate the securities laws. People, after all, cause entities to violate the securities
laws. Requiring the individual wrongdoers to disgorge profits and pay penalties
avoids the harm to innocent shareholders and is consistent with recommenda-
tions of other commentators with respect to collecting damages in private actions
from individual defendants. 20 6 The consequence of pursuing individuals, however,
would be smaller penalties. Corporate executives may be wealthy individuals, but
few of them have personal assets comparable to the corporation's wealth, and in-
dividual defendants would likely fight harder to keep their individual wealth than
corporate managers fight to keep assets within the corporation. As a result, indi-
viduals would receive less money in Fair Fund distributions, and the SEC's "brag-
ging rights" for collecting large sums on behalf of investors would be diminished.
Finally, the SEC should continue to bring aiding and abetting enforcement ac-
tions because private parties cannot. To the extent the aiders and abetters are
investment firms and other deep-pocket defendants, this is a source of significant
funding for Fair Fund distributions.
The above discussion illustrates that the SEC's enforcement policy must be
shaped by many competing considerations. Accordingly, compensating inves-
tors should not be a primary factor in selecting enforcement actions because SEC
enforcement actions serve important goals other than compensating investors-
namely, deterrence and investor confidence.
204. Professors Cox and Thomas criticize the SEC for not pursuing more large market-capitalization
defendants in the pre-Enron era. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 777-78. In their subsequent
paper, they observe that, post-Enron, the SEC shifted its enforcement focus away from firms in finan-
cial distress to companies where investors may have suffered larger losses. See James D. Cox & Randall S.
Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 893, 906 (2005).
205. See generally Margaret V Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing "The
Reasonable Investor" with "The Least Sophisticated Investor" in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REv. 473
(2006).
206. Professor Coffee goes so far as to suggest that Rule lOb-5 should be "disimplied" with respect
to the non-trading corporate defendants. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1582-84.
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The SEC faces similar competing considerations in negotiating settlements. It
may have important goals besides achieving compensation for investors, such
as ensuring that the corporation implements more effective internal controls
or adopts measures to assure better corporate governance. In negotiations with
tenacious, experienced defense attorneys, the SEC may have to make hard deci-
sions about what remedies it should impose in a settlement. If the SEC is primar-
ily motivated to obtain a large Fair Fund, it may be willing to sacrifice remedial
measures that, in the long run, are more beneficial to investors.
Finally, important elements of an enforcement program are fair notice and con-
sistency in assessing sanctions. The SEC needs to provide better guidance and
transparency in its corporate penalty policy Its Statement Concerning Financial
Penalties was a useful first step that awaits further implementation.
V. CONCLUSION
The SEC's increased power under section 308 has, to date, not received much
scholarly attention, but, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, it has important
implications for the SEC's mission to enforce securities laws and punish violators
as well as the ongoing debate over the future of the securities fraud class action.
There is no doubt that the SEC can gain political capital from proclaiming that it
is collecting and returning money to investors. However, a focus on compensat-
ing investors presents the danger that the SEC may give undue emphasis to the
possibility of obtaining a large settlement in its selection of enforcement actions.
Moreover, as its recent actions suggest, the SEC may sacrifice legal principles and
consistency in its zeal to create large Fair Fund distributions. Deemphasizing or
even eliminating the statutory requirement of disgorgement and increasing the
amounts of corporate penalties may have deflected the SEC's attention from which
investors have suffered the greater harm from corporate frauds-the shareholders
who purchased the stock at the artificially inflated price or the shareholders who
are harmed by the payment of the penalty Therefore, there should be distribution
of penalties to investors only where the SEC has identified the basis and amount
of actual ill-gotten gains and only to the extent that the SEC acts consistently with
its revised policy on corporate penalties. If the SEC follows its Statement Con-
cerning Financial Penalties, then its ability to use section 308 to create a sizable
fund for distribution to investors will be substantially reduced in financial fraud
cases where the corporation has not gained a tangible benefit.
Thus, even in the unlikely event of political will for a substantially larger agency
(which is particularly unlikely since a significant amount of civil penalties are no
longer going into the federal coffers), 20 7 effective enforcement policy is not neces-
sarily compatible with a dominant emphasis on recovering and returning funds
to investors.
207. A payment of a certain percentage of penalties to the U.S. Treasury to offset the decrease in
government revenues would be a reasonable policy, although it is very likely politically unpalatable.
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The securities fraud class action has its flaws and has, on occasion, been mis-
used. It remains, however, the most effective mechanism for shareholder com-
pensation. The policy that the business community is advocating-that the SEC
assume primary responsibility for collecting funds for investors-would not be a
sensible choice for the protection of investors.
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